state of affairs, it becomes more than ever the duty of the British Government seriously to consider what will be the probable result should the policy advocated at home be persisted in. We fear that it must infallibly lead to a war, and at no very distant date, between England and China; and, therefore, it is that we feel it incumbent on us to give expression to our opinion upon this momentous subject.
The question to be decided is, has the time arrived when the Chinese ought to be compelled to observe in its integrity the Treaty of Tientsin? We say that, though a grand opportunity of doing so with the utmost facility was lost some years ago on the suppression of the Taiping Rebellion, it can still be done without the exercise of undue pressure. The longer, however, the matter is postponed, the greater will be the difficulty of dealing with it, and the more imminent will be the danger of a war. Like all Eastern nations, the Chinese are destitute of any sense of political honor: and the only obligations their Rulers will ever acknowledge, are those they are enforced to observe. Delays on our part to insist upon our rights, far from being considered as an indulgence for which they ought to be grateful, are simply construed to be signs of weakness; and, therefore, the longer we defer to exact from them the strict performance of the Treaty, the more firmly will they be impressed with the idea that we are afraid of a rupture, and the more obstinate will they be in evading or violating its provisions. We cannot do better than quote the following forcible expressions used by Sir Rutherford Alcock in his despatch of the 5th of February, 1869, to Lord Stanley, your Lordship's predecessor as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs:
"Experience leads infallibly to the conviction that where Treaties have been imposed by force upon an unwilling government, as all with China have been, they can only be upheld by similar means."
"The diplomatic instrument has no binding power with Chinese when its stipulations may be evaded with impunity, or whenever it is believed that the force that imposed them is no longer extant or available."
"Diplomacy in such circumstances means armed reason, the only evidence of power or title to respect a true Oriental freely recognizes, and in order that foreign Powers may not have to resort to such rude instruments for proving their title, it behooves them to find means of preventing accumulative violations of Treaty, since continued impunity brings with it a conviction of weakness."
"It is weakness, or the suspicion of it, which invariably provokes aggression, and with Eastern nations, is a far more fruitful cause of bad faith and danger than either force or the abuse of it."
"The desire to avoid complications and wars in the far East should suggest, not an unreasoning recoil from the assertion of Treaty rights from fear of the troubles it may bring, but a steadfast adherence to such conditions of intercourse as experience has proved to be best calculated in the end to ensure respect for engagements."
We deprecate a further delay in compelling the due observance of the Tientsin Treaty, because we fear that it will only tend to those "accumulative violations," which the British Minister declares too often occasion hostilities.
This leads us to the consideration of those provisions of the Treaty of Tientsin, of the infraction of which we have long complained; and which we think ought in future to be strictly enforced; and we shall take them in their numerical order.
The 9th clause by which British subjects are authorised to travel for pleasure or trading purposes to all parts of the interior is wholly inoperative except to some extent as regards the former object. The time has arrived when all unnecessary restrictions on travelling, which were perhaps necessary in some portions of the Empire during the Rebellion of the Tai-pings, ought to be done away with. No injury possibly can accrue to the Chinese Government by their removal; because in all cases Passports must be issued by the Foreign Consuls, who would exercise their discretion in granting permits, and withhold them when applied for by dangerous or suspicious characters. The right to trade in the interior was undoubtedly acquired by the Treaty of Tientsin, and the privilege having been withheld in practice from British subjects is as much the result of the retrogressive foreign policy as of conservative action on the part of the Chinese.
That great benefit would be derived by the countries from increased intercourse between British and Chinese subjects, is certain. The experience of the past proves it. In spite of the vexatious restrictions which have so improperly been imposed by the Chinese Government, and the narrow limits within which we have hitherto been permitted to carry on our trade directly, it has increased enormously within the last few years; and if the vast and fertile Provinces still closed to us were opened to the foreign merchant, it is almost impossible to calculate what dimensions our commerce with China would attain. Take, for instance Sze-chuen, the largest as well as the richest Province of China; in size it surpasses many a European State; its population is rich and numerous; its soil of exuberant fertility; and its natural productions most various and valuable; why should we not be permitted to carry on unrestrictedly trading operations there? From the valuable and interesting report recently published by the Delegates of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce on the trade of the Upper Yangtsze, it is clear that the people themselves are most anxious to trade with us; and that if no opposition was shown by the Mandarins not the least difficulty would occur in commencing operations.
By article 10th, the Yangtze river was opened to British merchant ships as far as Hankow. We strongly urge upon your Lordship the expediency of opening still more of that magnificent river, as also the other navigable ones, with the great Poyang and Tung Ting lakes. Were that done, we should rapidly acquire an enormous trade with the rich Provinces bordering on those waters, which are now virtually closed to foreign merchants; and the most brilliant results might fairly be anticipated.
We should, however, premise that inland navigation will be nugatory unless permission be conceded to use steam vessels. Sir Rutherford Alcock in a letter dated the 23rd of March, 1869, to Consul Medhurst, says, "that no efforts hitherto made by me or by my colleagues in Peking, and they have been both earnest and continuous, have prevailed with the Chinese Government, or succeeded in removing their objections to initiatory steps in the direction of Railways, Inland Steam Navigation, &c." We give the British Minister full credit for having done all in his power to induce the Chinese Government to accede to the views so universally entertained by the foreign residents in China upon the vital importance of employing steam vessels for inland navigation; and we can well believe that all such efforts will be resisted by the Authorities at Pekin with their usual obstructiveness; but at the same time we feel convinced that by the legitimate use of the influence which Great Britain ought to possess in this Empire the opposition could easily and quickly be overcome. "If the Chinese Government object, as stated by Sir Rutherford Alcock, to take initiatory steps in that direction, let permission be obtained for us to do so, and we venture to predict that in a very short time, steamers will ply on all the navigable Chinese inland waters.
The subjects of steamers leads us naturally to Railroads and Telegraphs; and we fully endorse the opinion which has been so constantly reiterated by all who know anything of the country, that nothing will benefit it more, or tend more to develop the boundless resources...
Page 253
state of affairs, it becomes more than ever the duty of the British Government seriously to consider what will be the probable result should the policy advocated at home be persisted in. We fear that it must infallibly lead to a war, and at no very distant date, between England and China; and, therefore, it is that we feel it incumbent on na to give expression to our opinion upon this momentous subject.
The question to be decided is, has the time! arrival when the Chinese ought to be com- pelled to observe in its integrity the Treaty of Tientsin ? We say that, though a grand op portunity of doing so with the upmost facility, was lost some years ago on the suppression of the Taiping Rebellion, it can still be done without the exercise of undue pressure. The longer, however, the matter is postponed, the greater will be the difficulty of dealing with it, and the more imminent will be the danger of a war. Like all Eastern nations, the Chinese are destitute of any sense of political honor: and the only obligations their Rulers will ever acknowledge, are those they are en- forced to observe. Delays on our part to insist upon our rights, far from being considered as an indulgence for which they ought to be grate fal, are simply construed to be signs of weak- ness; and, therefore, the longer we defer to exact from them the strict performance of the Treaty, the more firmly will they be impressed with the idea that we are afraid of a rupture. and the more obstinate will they be in evading or violating its provisions. We cannot do: better than quote the following forcible ex- pressions used by Sir Rutherford Alcock in his despatch of the 5th of February, 1869, to Lord Stanley, your Lordship's predecessor as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs:
Experience leads infallibly to the convic tion that where Treaties have been imposed by force upon an unwilling government, as all with China have been, they can only be upheld by similar means."
"The diplomatic instrument bas.no binding power with Chinese when its stipulations may be evaded with impunity, or whenever it is be- lieved that the fores that imposed them is no longer extant or available.”
11
Diplomacy in such circumstances means armed reason, the only evidence of power or title to respect a true Oriental freely recognizes, and in order that foreign Powers may not have to resort to such rude instruments for proving their title, it bebores them to find means of preventing accumulatives violations of Treaty, since continued impunity brings with it a conviction of weakness.”
"It is weakness, or the suspicion of it, which invariably provokes aggression, and with Eastern nations, is a far more fruitfal cause of bad faith and danger than either force or the abase of it."
"The desire to avoid complications and wars in the far East should suggest, not an uurea- soning recoil from the assertion of Treaty rights from fear of the troubles it may bring, but a steadfast adberence to such conditions of in- tercourse as experience has proved to be beat. calculated in the end to ensure respect for engagements.”
We deprecate a further delay in compelling the due observance of the Tientsin Treaty, because we fear that it will only tend to those "accumu- latives violations," which the British Minister declares too often occasion hostilities.
This leads us to the consideration of those provisions of the Treaty of Tientsin, of the in- fraction of which we have long complained; and which we think ought in future to be strictly enforced; and we shall take them in their numerical order.
The 9th clanse by which British subjects are authorised to travel for pleasure or trading purposes to all parts of the interior is wholly inoperative except to some extent as regards the former object. The time has arrived when all unnecessary restrictions on travelling, which were perhaps necessary in some portions of the
1
Empire during the Rebellion of the Tai-pins, ought to be done away with. No injury possibly accrue to the Chinese Government by their removal; because in all cases Passports must be issued by the Foreign Consuls, who would exercise their discretion in granting permits, and withhold them when applied for by dangerous or suspicions characters. The right to trade in the interior was undoubtedly acquired by the Treaty of Tientsin, and the privilege having been withheld in practice British subjects is as much the result of the retrogressive foreign policy as of conservative action on on the part of the Chinese.
That great benefit would be derived by th countries from increased intercourse bat zen, British and Chinese subjects, is certain. The experience of the past proves it. In spite of the vexations restrictions which have so improperly been imposed by the Chinese Government, and the narrow limits within which we have hitherto been permitted to carry on our trade directly. it has increased enormously within the last few years; and if the vast and fertile Provinces still closed to us were opened to the foreign mer- chant, it is almost impossible to calculate what dimensions our commerce with China would attain. Take, for instance Sze-chuen, the largest as well as the richest Province of China; in size it surpasses many a European State; its population is rich and numerous; its sail of exuberant fertility; and its natural pro- ductions most various and valuable; why should we not be permitted to fcarry on unre. strictedly trading operations there? From the valuable and interesting report recently pub. lished by the Delegates of the Shanghai Cham- ber of Commerce on the trade of the Upper Yangtsze, it is clear that the people themselves are most anxious to trade with us; and that if no opposition was shewn by the Mandarins not the least difficulty would occur in com- mencing operations.
By article 10th, the Yangtze river was opened to British merchant ships as far as Hankow. We strongly urge upon your Lord ship the expediency of opening still more of that magnificent river, as also the other navi. gable ones, with the great Poyang and Toong Ting lakes. Were that done, we should rapidly acquire an enormous trade with the rich Provinces bordering on those waters. which are now virtually closed
to foreign merchants; and the most brilliant results might fairly be anticipated.
We should, however, premise that inland navigation will be nugatory unless permission be conceded to use steam vessels. Sir Rutber- ford Alcock in a letter dated the 23rd of March, 1869, to Consul Medhurst, says, "that no efforts hitherto made by me or by my colleagues in Peking, and they have been both earnest and continnous, have prevailed with the Chinese Government, or succeeded in removing their objections to initiatory steps in the direction of We Railways, Inland Steam Navigation, &c." give the British Minister full credit for having done all in his power to induce the Chinese Government to accede to the views so univer- sally entertained by the foreign residents in China upon the vital importance of employing steam vessels for inland navigation; and we can well believe that all such efforts will be re sisted by the Anthorities at Pekin with their usual obstructiveness; but at the same time we feel convinced that by the legitimate use of the influence which Great Britain ought to possESS in this Empire the opposition could easily and "If the Chiness Govern- quickly be overcome. ment object, as stated by Sir Rutherford Al- cook, tu take initiatory step in that direction, let permission be obtained for us to do so, and we venture to predict that in a very short time, steamers will ply on all the navigable Chinese inland waters.
The subjects of steamers leads us naturally to Railroads and Telegraphs; and we fully endorse the opinion which has been so con- stantly reiterated by all who know anything of the country, that nothing will benefit it more, or tend
more to develop the boundless
!
253
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